US-China relations and the liberal world order:Contending elites, colliding visions? by de Graaff, Naná & van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan
VU Research Portal
US-China relations and the liberal world order




DOI (link to publisher)
10.1093/ia/iix232
document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
document license
Article 25fa Dutch Copyright Act
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
de Graaff, N., & van Apeldoorn, B. (2018). US-China relations and the liberal world order: Contending elites,
colliding visions? International Affairs, 94(1), 113-131. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix232
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 27. May. 2021
US–China relations and the liberal world 
order: contending elites, colliding visions?
NANÁ DE GRAAFF AND BASTIAAN VAN APELDOORN*
International Affairs 94: 1 (2018) 113–131; doi: 10.1093/ia/iix232
© The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of International Affairs. All rights 
reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com
The future of liberal internationalism—the dominant elite world-view that has 
underpinned an America-centred liberal world order—will increasingly be influ-
enced by the re-emergence of China as a major power on the world stage, and by 
the way in which the United States reacts to China’s growing influence. Since the 
Second World War the United States has led a world order based on principles of 
economic and political liberalism and a commitment to global open markets and 
the promotion of ‘free market democracies’.1 The order is rules-based inasmuch 
as it is solidified in liberal global institutions established by and centred on US 
power,2 but also crucially underpinned by a preponderant military with global 
reach.3 The end of the Cold War left this order, and the American hegemony 
acting as its guarantor, temporarily unchallenged. However, China’s ‘opening 
up’ since 1978, and its subsequent unprecedented path of capitalist growth and 
expansion to its current position as the second largest economy in the world with 
the second largest military, have sparked much academic and public debate on 
whether a rising China will seek to change the rules of the liberal world order and 
challenge the United States as the hegemon within it.
Even if America’s market power is still unparalleled and underpinned by the 
dollar’s status as the unrivalled global reserve currency,4 even if China’s military 
budget is still only about one-third of America’s, and even if the Chinese political 
economy is plagued by its own contradictions such as overcapacity and a spiralling 
debt, China does represent—in terms of the size of its population and its growth 
potential—a world power with the ability to challenge America’s status as a leading 
global power in the coming era.5 This is why some authors find it  conceivable 
* We thank three anonymous reviewers for their valuable input; any remaining errors are ours. 
1 Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Naná de Graaff, American grand strategy and corporate elite networks: the open door since 
the end of the Cold War (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 116–17.
2 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: the origins, crisis and transformation of the American world order (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2011).
3 Christopher Layne, The peace of illusions: American grand strategy from the 1940s to the present (Ithaca, NY, and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2006); van Apeldoorn and de Graaff, American grand strategy and corporate 
elite networks. 
4 Ho-fung Hung, The China boom: why China will not rule the world (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2015); Doug Stokes, ‘Achilles’ deal: dollar decline and US grand strategy after the crisis’, Review of International 
Political Economy 21: 5, 2014, pp. 1071–94; Daniel Drezner, ‘Bad debts: assessing China’s financial influence in 
Great Power politics’, International Security 34: 2, 2009, pp. 7–45.
5 Cf. Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, ‘The rise and fall of the Great Powers in the twenty-first century: 
China’s rise and the fate of America’s global position’, International Security 40: 3, 2016, pp. 7–53.
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that China will come to act as what Schweller and Pu have called a ‘spoiler’ of 
the system, seeking to overthrow the rules-based liberal world order.6 Others, 
however, have highlighted the fact that to date China has actually been largely 
adapting to the liberal rules of the game as formulated within US-dominated 
global institutions rather than challenging them, acting as a supporter of the 
current system.7 China’s compliance with WTO rules is a case in point.8 The 
question thus remains to what extent and how China is adapting to or confronting 
the liberal order—and US power and position within that order—which in turn 
is both influenced by and shaping the way in which the United States itself is 
responding to China’s rise.
We identify three scenarios regarding the evolution of the US–China relation-
ship and its implications for world order. The first scenario is one of (inevitable) 
conflict. The realist version presents this in balance-of-power terms, with China’s 
emergence as a global Great Power threatening America’s position as hegemon. 
While some realists view American decline as inevitable and advocate accommo-
dation to China’s rising power,9 most argue that the United States should and will 
resist this challenge by pursuing a ‘containment’ strategy, leading to a new Cold 
War or even open military conflict.10 Others look more at the illiberal nature of 
China’s domestic regime, and the threat its authoritarian and statist version of 
capitalism might pose to the West and the liberal order.11 To the extent that China 
does not want to be part of this liberal sphere under US leadership, US–China 
confrontation becomes more likely.
In the second scenario, that of co-optation, China will let itself be  incorporated 
into the liberal order. In this scenario, what we describe below as America’s strategy 
of ‘liberal engagement’ will pay off: China, taking into account its own self-interest 
and the deepening interdependence between the world’s two largest economies, 
will choose to adapt to what the Obama administration called the ‘rules of the road’. 
This would also imply a gradual abandoning of its ‘statist’ model of economic and 
political governance. This scenario, associated above all with liberal theorists, might 
unfold even in the case of America’s relative hegemonic decline, simply because, it is 
argued, the liberal order is so attractive: it has low costs of entry, while participating 
in it brings great benefits in terms of prosperity and legitimacy.12
6 Randall Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, ‘After unipolarity: China’s visions of international order in an era of US 
decline’, International Security 36: 1, 2011, pp. 41–72. 
7 Schweller and Pu, ‘After unipolarity’.
8 Christopher McNally, ‘Sino-capitalism: China’s re-emergence and the international political economy’, World 
Politics 64: 4, 2012, pp. 741–66. 
9 Christopher Layne, ‘The US foreign policy establishment and grand strategy: how American elites obstruct 
strategic adjustment’, International Politics 54: 3, 2017, pp. 260–75; Wu Xinbo, ‘Cooperation, competition and 
shaping the outlook: the United States and China’s neighbourhood diplomacy’, International Affairs 92: 4, July 
2016, pp. 849–68. 
10 John Mearsheimer, ‘The gathering storm: China’s challenge to US power in Asia’, Chinese Journal of Interna-
tional Politics 3: 4, 2010, pp. 381–96; Graham Allison, Destined for war: can America and China escape Thucydides’s 
trap? (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).
11 Ian Bremmer, ‘State capitalism comes of age: the end of the free market?’, Foreign Affairs 88: 3, 2009, pp. 40–56.
12 G. John Ikenberry, ‘The rise of China and the future of the West: can the liberal system survive?’, Foreign 
Affairs 87: 1, Jan.–Feb. 2008, pp. 23–37; Liberal Leviathan; and ‘Illusion of geopolitics: the enduring power of 
the liberal order’, Foreign Affairs 93: 3, May–June 2014, pp. 93, 80.
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These two scenarios are the most commonly found in the literature; but we 
identify the possibility of a third, one of coexistence. Here the United States and 
China would each maintain their own distinct political and economic system, 
both systems being—in different ways—part of and compatible with a capitalist 
and globally interlinked world economy. In this hybrid scenario China retains 
a relatively autonomous trajectory, partially adapting to the rules of the game 
of the liberal order, but at the same time holding on to distinctive aspects of its 
state–society model and foreign policy orientation. Such a scenario—which might 
come close to what Zeng and Breslin identify as a ‘G2 with Chinese characteris-
tics’13—seems to align with the ‘new type of Great Power relations’ that President 
Xi Jinping has in mind, and fits with an emerging consensus within China that 
the country needs to take a more proactive leading role in global politics.14 Such a 
scenario would, however, also require partial adaptation—and accommodation—
on the part of the United States,15 and the key question therefore naturally arises 
whether the US is prepared to undertake such adaptation.
We will return to these scenarios of conflict, co-optation and coexistence in 
the final part of this article, where we will reflect upon their respective likelihood 
and the future of the liberal world order in the light of the radical shift that the 
Trump presidency seems to represent. We will do so on the basis of an analysis 
that examines China’s changing foreign policy in the course of its rise as a ‘statist’ 
power within the liberal order, and America’s grand strategic response to this rise 
throughout three post-Cold War administrations. Our key proposition is that a 
comprehensive understanding of these developments and their implications for 
the liberal world order requires a perspective that takes into account the domestic 
and social sources of foreign policy, rooted in a domestic political economy that 
is interlinked with an evolving global political economy, crucially mediated by 
elite networks and elite strategies.16 We begin in the next section by outlining our 
perspective.
A critical political economy perspective on US–China relations
Whereas realists fully abstract the state from society and merely conceive of China 
and the United States as clashing Great Powers, liberals tend to assume (or hope) 
that a non-liberal China will converge on a liberal America. We argue that making 
sense of US–China relations and their development with respect to world order 
requires a deeper understanding and analysis of the respective domestic political 
economies, each of which is increasingly linked to a global capitalist economy. 
13 Jinghan Zeng and Shaun Breslin, ‘China’s “new type of Great Power relations”: a G2 with Chinese character-
istics?’, International Affairs 92: 4, July 2016, pp. 773–94.
14 Zeng and Breslin, ‘China’s “new type of Great Power relations”’, pp. 776–7.
15 Jinghan Zeng, Yuefan Xiao and Shaun Breslin, ‘Securing China’s core interests: the state of the debate in 
China’, International Affairs 91: 2, March 2015, p. 250.
16 This approach aligns well with what Skidmore has called a ‘social order approach’, positing the need to take 
into account the internal contradictions and political contestation within societies over the proper social 
order. See David Skidmore, ed., Contested social orders and international politics (Nashville and London: Vanderbilt 
University Press, 1997). 
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We therefore move beyond the state-centrism that is still ingrained in much Inter-
national Relations (IR) theory to take as our point of departure what Robert 
Cox called ‘state–society complexes’.17 From such a critical political economy 
perspective we see states as structurally related to society and to the predominant 
social and economic structures within that society.18 States, furthermore, are not 
so much actors in their own right as entities that always act through people—
policy-making, governing elites; and these elites in turn are embedded in wider 
social networks, relating them to broader social structures that shape their ideas 
and world-views, and hence their policy-making.
In the case of the United States, its liberal capitalist political economy is charac-
terized by a structure at the apex of which we find the oligarchic top segment of 
an autonomous capitalist class.19 The US political system is consequently structur-
ally biased towards the interests of the corporate community, secured through a 
persistently revolving door and through the so-called policy planning process.20 
That process takes place primarily within think-tanks and foundations which 
are in turn closely interlocked with the corporate elite, generating a particular 
(pro-business) elite consensus and world-view that then feed into public policy-
making.21 It is our argument that the close nexus of this corporate elite, and its 
predominantly globalist outlook, with the foreign policy-making establishment22 
helps to account for America’s overall foreign policy of the past decades, and will 
remain an important variable in determining future US strategy vis-à-vis China.
In the Chinese state–society complex, primacy rests not with an autonomous 
capitalist class but ultimately with the state and a state class organized around 
the Communist Party, which is still the dominant source of power in society.23 
Although the Chinese economy is rapidly internationalizing, and the leadership 
is strongly orientated towards capitalist development and increasingly pursues 
policies of liberalization and privatization24—if only up to a certain point—the 
regime remains wedded to what we have elsewhere called a ‘state-directed’ form 
of capitalism,25 fundamentally distinct from that of the United States.
In contrast to realist analyses, then, our perspective implies that China’s rise to 
global power may be substantively different, in at least some respects, from the 
17 Robert Cox, ‘Social forces, states and world orders: beyond International Relations theory’, Millennium 12: 2, 
1981, pp. 162–75.
18 Van Apeldoorn and de Graaff, American grand strategy and corporate elite networks, ch. 1.
19 Jeffrey A. Winters and Benjamin I. Page, ‘Oligarchy in the United States?’, Perspectives on Politics 7: 4, 2009, 
pp.  731–51.
20 William G. Domhoff, Who rules America? Challenges to corporate and class dominance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
2009).
21 Inderjeet Parmar, Foundations of the American century: the Ford, Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations in the rise of 
American power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); van Apeldoorn and de Graaff, American grand 
strategy and corporate elite networks, ch. 3.
22 Layne, ‘The US foreign policy establishment’.
23 Martin Jacques, When China rules the world: the end of the western world and the birth of a new global order (New York: 
Penguin, 2012; first publ. 2009); Tobias Ten Brink, ‘Paradoxes of prosperity in China’s new capitalism’, Journal 
of Current Chinese Affairs 42: 3, 2013, pp. 17–44; Naná de Graaff and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, ‘US elite power 
and the rise of “statist” Chinese elites in global markets’, International Politics 54: 3, 2017, pp. 338–55. 
24 McNally, ‘Sino-capitalism’.
25 Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Naná de Graaff and Henk Overbeek, ‘Reconfiguration of the global state–capital 
nexus’, Globalizations 9: 4, 2012, p. 475.
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rise of the United States to the position of world hegemon, precisely because of 
its distinctive state–society model and the way in which this relates to a changing 
global political and economic context. These particularities and changing dynamics 
need to be taken into account, rather than just assuming that China, America 
and other states behave in a structurally equivalent manner. Moving beyond the 
unitary state perspective, we may thus find particular sets of interests, which may be in 
conflict or alignment, as well as colliding and/or converging visions, related to the distinc-
tive respective characteristics of the Chinese and American state–society models. 
It is from this perspective that in the following section we first describe China’s 
shifting foreign policy within the post-Cold War US-led liberal world order.
China’s shifting foreign policy: from ‘keeping a low profile’
to a ‘new type of Great Power relation’
China’s foreign policy vision during the 1990s, under the leadership of Deng 
Xiaoping—who introduced the ‘opening up’ economic reforms of the late 1970s 
that led to China’s exponential economic growth and gradual integration into 
the world economy—was based on ‘keeping a low profile’ (taoguangyanghui). 
This meant that China should avoid taking on international responsibilities and 
develop quietly.26 With its international reputation damaged by the Tiananmen 
Square incident of 1989, and with the daunting task of sustaining a population 
of more than 1.1 billion with an annual GDP per capita of about US$300, the 
focus was on domestic economic development and reform aimed at establishing a 
socialist market economy.27 Regarding the United States, China opted for ‘raising 
no banner’: that is, it was keen to make it clear that it had no ambition to ‘under-
take leadership’ and would not seek expansion or hegemony.28 This strategy was 
largely followed by Deng’s successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the latter 
frequently stressing the need to be ‘moderate and cautious’ in order to avoid 
arousing fear of China’s rapid growth.29 Under Jiang’s and Hu’s leadership China 
made further major leaps in domestic development and towards further integra-
tion into the world economy, the biggest milestone arguably being China’s acces-
sion to the WTO in 2001. But as China’s economy grew and its integration into 
the world economy deepened, the debate within and outside China on its proper 
role and influence also intensified, in particular given the apparent mismatch 
between its economic position and its influence (as expressed, for example, in 
voting power) within the architecture of liberal institutions in charge of global 
economic  governance, such as the IMF and World Bank.
Under President Xi, then, China’s foreign policy strategy has seen a significant 
shift from ‘keeping a low profile’ towards ‘striving for achievement’ (fenfayouwei),30 
26 Yan Xuetong, ‘From keeping a low profile to striving for achievement’, Chinese Journal of International Politics 
7: 2, 2014, p. 154. 
27 Zhu Rongji, trans. June Y. Mei, On the record: the road to reform 1991–1997 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2013).
28 Yan, ‘From keeping a low profile’, p. 155; see also Deng Xiaoping, Selected works of Deng Xiaoping volume III 
(1982–1992) (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1994). 
29 Yan, ‘From keeping a low profile’, p. 156.
30 Yan, ‘From keeping a low profile’, p. 154.
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and the establishment of ‘a favourable international environment for China’s 
national rejuvenation’.31 This shift implied that China should be taking a more 
proactive role in global politics and defending its core interests more assertively.32 
A lively and extensively researched debate is now going on in China—among its 
foreign policy-making elite and the academic community that advises them—on 
this change in the country’s strategy.33 And although some disagreement remains,34 
there seems to be an emerging consensus that China is now in a position to assert 
its interests more strongly, to ‘redress perceived inequities and governance gaps 
and [to increase its] “institutional voice”’.35 There is also a consensus, however, 
that China is by no means ready to take a leading role to the extent of overtaking 
the United States, at least not in the coming decade(s).36 Overall, having formerly 
been a rule-taker, China is increasingly becoming a rule-maker, or at least a rule-
shaper.37
The change in strategy is evidenced by China’s much more proactive role on 
the world stage including a whole range of institutional and economic initiatives, 
as well as a more assertive military posture, in particular in the South and East 
China Seas.38 Two key institutional and economic initiatives are the establish-
ment of the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) and the ‘belt and 
road initiative’, previously known as ‘one belt, one road’ (OBOR).39 The AIIB, 
headquartered in Beijing, was set up in 2015—against great opposition from the 
United States—with the aim of complementing the World Bank and partly out of 
frustration with the unbalanced and outdated distribution of voting power within 
the latter institution.40 Its clearly stated purpose is to foster regional growth and 
influence under Chinese leadership; and China, with around 28 per cent of the 
votes in the new institution, and about half of the World’s Bank’s capital at its 
disposal, has quite some leverage. The massive infrastructural ‘belt and road initia-
tive’—hailed by President Xi as ‘the project of the century’—while to a large 
31 Zeng and Breslin, ‘China’s “new type of Great Power relations”’, p. 774.
32 For more in-depth studies, see Zeng et al., ‘Securing China’s core interests’, pp. 245–66; Jinghan Zeng, 
‘Constructing a new type of Great Power relations: the state of the debate in China (2008–2014)’, British Jour-
nal of Politics and International Relations 18: 2, 2016, pp. 422–4; Zeng and Breslin, ‘China’s “new type of Great 
Power relations”’.
33 Zeng and Breslin, ‘China’s “new type of Great Power relations”’; Zeng et al., ‘Securing China’s core interests’; 
Mark Beeson and Fujian Li, ‘What consensus? Geopolitics and policy paradigms in China and the United 
States’, International Affairs 91: 1, Jan. 2015, pp. 93–109; Zeng, ‘Constructing a new type’; Michael Swaine, ‘Xi 
Jinping on Chinese foreign relations: the governance of China and Chinese commentary’, China Leadership 
Monitor, no. 48, Fall 2015, http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/fall-2015-issue-48. 
(Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 11 Oct. 2017.)
34 Yan, ‘From keeping a low profile’.
35 Zeng and Breslin, ‘China’s “new type of Great Power relations”’, p. 777.
36 Zeng et al., ‘Securing China’s core interests’, p. 250.
37 We are thankful to Ivan Rasmussen for highlighting this nuance. See also Zeng et al., ‘Securing China’s core 
interests’, p. 250.
38 Suisheng Zhao, ‘American reflections on the engagement with China and responses to President Xi’s new 
model of major power relations’, Journal of Contemporary China 26: 106, 2017, pp. 489–503.
39 Hong Yu, ‘Motivation behind China’s “one belt, one road” initiatives and establishment of the Asian Infra-
structure Investment Bank’, Journal of Contemporary China 26: 105, 2017, pp. 353–68; Peter Ferdinand, ‘West-
ward ho—the China dream and “one belt, one road”: Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping’, International 
Affairs 92: 4, July 2016, pp. 941–57.
40 Alice de Jonge, ‘Perspectives on the emerging role of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’, International 
Affairs 93: 5, Sept. 2017, pp. 1061–84.
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extent driven by (domestic) economic concerns such as industrial overproduc-
tion and unemployment, and with the aim of boosting growth in the still under-
developed western regions of China, seems to have even grander geopolitical 
and geo-economic underpinnings and ramifications. It has already been likened 
to a new Marshall Plan—made in China—and if successful will establish a vast 
network of infrastructure (roads, rails, ports and maritime routes) incorporating 
more than 60 countries across Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Europe—with 
China at its heart.
In the realm of (free) trade China has meanwhile been working persistently 
on the establishment of regional free trade agreements, such as the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which would form a free trade 
area encompassing almost half the world’s population and a quarter of the world’s 
exports. With Trump’s withdrawal of America from the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
agreement (TPP), the RCEP potentially provides China with a major position and 
platform in regional free trade, one from which the United States is excluded.
In terms of military buildup, China has seen an estimated increase in defence 
spending from about US$10 billion in 1991 to US$215 billion in 2016,41 and now 
ranks second in the world. The growing tensions in the South China Sea—where 
territorial disputes between China and other regional claimants (such as the Philip-
pines, Taiwan and Vietnam) have flared up, and where China is reclaiming land by 
building or expanding (artificial) islands as well as installing airstrips and military 
bases, provoking the US to deploy so-called ‘freedom of navigation’ operations—
serve for many observers as a reminder of China’s growing military assertiveness 
and its possible consequences in terms of major power rivalry.42
An elite perspective on China’s foreign policy
While the developments described above clearly indicate China’s assumption of 
a more assertive global role, states rising to Great Power status do not necessarily 
behave in structurally similar ways. In order to arrive at a proper understanding 
of the nature of China’s rise and its implications for US–China relations and the 
future of the liberal order, we need to analyse the country’s historically configured 
distinctive state–society model, as well as its elite leadership and the elite world-
views that generate its distinctive grand strategic visions. Indeed, the recent shift 
in China’s foreign policy is linked to a number of characteristics that have been 
essential elements of its foreign policy for decades,43 and that are quite distinctive 
from American grand strategic views.
One key characteristic is the emphasis on long-term ‘peaceful development’, 
emphasizing the ‘maintenance of a positive and beneficial relation with the outside 
world’ and the ‘solemn pledge to “never seek hegemony or commit any act of 
41 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, ‘Military Expenditure Database’, 2017, https://www.sipri.
org/databases/milex.
42 Doug Stokes and Kit Waterman, ‘Security leverage, structural power and US strategy in east Asia’, International 
Affairs 93: 5, Sept. 2017, pp. 1039–60.
43 Swaine, ‘Xi Jinping on Chinese foreign relations’.
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expansion”’.44 This vision, as formulated by President Xi in his 2014 overview 
entitled Governance of China,45 implies a promotion of cooperative patterns of 
interstate relations, aimed at ‘win–win’ solutions and mutual benefits, rather than 
zero-sum power politics. A second key characteristic is the emphasis on respect for 
differences in terms of political and socio-economic systems and values, and the 
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. The Chinese 
perspective here distinguishes itself from western liberal interventionism and the 
imposition of the Washington Consensus, as well as regime change justified by 
reference to human rights, that have characterized the liberal international order 
under US leadership.46
While words and deeds must of course be disentangled, from our perspective 
the elite world-views and ideas that feed into foreign policy must also be related 
to what we call their social sources. In the case of China this involves a political 
economy characterized by a distinctive form of capitalism, which has spawned a 
rich and diverse literature and a great number of conceptualizations, ranging from 
‘state-permeated market-economy’ to ‘Sino-capitalism’.47
Adding to this literature, our perspective emphasizes the role of agency—and, 
more specifically, elite agency—as a crucial factor. Although there are several 
excellent studies on the factions within Chinese domestic elites,48 there is as 
yet very little available in terms of systematic empirical analysis of the Chinese 
foreign policy elites, their social ties and their (corporate) elite backgrounds and 
networks. In particular, there has been little investigation of the extent to which 
Chinese foreign policy-making elites and transnationalizing corporate elites 
are integrated—or not—into the transnational elite networks that form the 
dominant power structures in US-centred global capitalism.49 While much more 
research can and should be undertaken in this domain, we will here—as a starting 
point—offer a few findings from our earlier studies on the transnationalization 
of China’s oil and gas industry, a sector at the heart of global production and 
major power politics.50 This research was based on case-studies of Chinese state-
owned oil companies, and involved mapping and analysing their international 
44 Swaine, ‘Xi Jinping on Chinese foreign relations’, p. 4.
45 Xi Jinping, The governance of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2014). 
46 Amitai Etzioni, ‘Point of order: is China more Westphalian than others?’, Foreign Policy 9: 6, 2011, pp. 1–10.
47 McNally, ‘Sino-capitalism’; Christopher McNally, ‘Strange bedfellows: Communist Party institutions and 
new governance mechanisms in Chinese state holding corporations’, Business and Politics 4: 1, 2002, pp. 91–115; 
Andreas Nölke, Tobias ten Brink, Simone Claar and Christian May, ‘Domestic structures, foreign economic 
policies and global economic order: implications from the rise of large emerging economies’, European Journal 
of International Relations 21: 3, 2015, pp. 538–67; Shaun Breslin, ‘The “China model” and the global crisis: from 
Friedrich List to a Chinese mode of governance?’, International Affairs 87: 6, Nov. 2011, pp. 1323–43; Ten Brink, 
‘Paradoxes of prosperity’.
48 See e.g. McNally, ‘Strange bedfellows’, ‘Sino-capitalism’; Ten Brink, ‘Paradoxes of prosperity’; Victor Shih, 
Factions and finance in China: elite conflict and inflation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Cheng 
Li, One party, two coalitions in Chinese politics (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 16 Aug. 2009), http://
www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/08/16/one-party-two-coalitions-in-chinas-politics/.
49 William K. Carroll, The making of a transnational capitalist class: corporate power in the 21st century (London and New 
York: Zed, 2010). We use transnational here to denote relations and (social) spaces that extend across national 
borders and involve both state actors and private actors. 
50 Naná de Graaff, ‘Global networks and the two faces of Chinese oil companies’, Perspectives on Global Devel-
opment and Technology 3: 4, 2014, pp. 539–63; de Graaff and van Apeldoorn, ‘US elite power and the rise of 
Chinese “statist” elites’. 
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 corporate networks, as well as the corporate and political networks of their 
directors. The network analyses51 were combined with qualitative analyses on 
the basis of in-depth interviews conducted in Beijing with individuals including 
representatives of the China National Petroleum Corporation, consultants, 
experts,  corporate directors, diplomats and lawyers.52
Transnationalizing corporate elite networks with Chinese characteristics
First of all, the research showed that Chinese state-owned oil companie, as part 
of their investment spree, are increasingly forming corporate alliances with both 
state-owned and private firms, including many of the world’s largest transnational 
corporations (TNCs), such as ExxonMobil, BP and Shell and thus becoming 
‘partners’ in the global corporate networks that to date have been dominated by 
American and European firms. It is also clear that their investment decisions and 
operations abroad, while originally part of a primarily state-driven strategy, are 
increasingly also commercially driven. Nonetheless, these state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs) remain distinctive in the sense that they have to perform a dual role, 
adhering to commercial principles abroad (e.g. prioritizing profit-making) but 
retaining the responsibilities of a state-owned company at home (e.g. prioritizing 
energy security and social stability). Thus, even if their investment decisions are 
increasingly driven by corporate motives—rather than the (geo)political motives 
often attributed to them—and even if they increasingly form hybrid alliances 
with private oil firms, they do remain firmly tied to the state’s interests and priori-
ties. This example illustrates the essentially contradictory nature of Chinese trans-
nationalizing state-directed capital.
With regard to the directors of the Chinese oil SOEs, we found their social 
networks to be quite distinct from the extensive and diversified corporate 
networks typical of top western executives and directors. Nor did we find 
any affiliations to the kind of policy planning networks (think-tanks, business 
associations and so on) in which, for instance, American corporate directors 
are typically embedded.53 The Chinese directors were intimately connected to 
the state, a large majority holding top-level state positions before and during 
their SOE directorships. Since the cases investigated here are SOEs, this is of 
course not particularly surprising. The finding of particular relevance here is 
how these top directors have to balance what we have called their ‘two faces’:54 
on the one hand, they have to direct an expansionist, transnationalizing corpo-
rate strategy with concomitant commercial values and interests; on the other 
hand, they remain firmly tied to state and party interests, a bond which entails a 
commitment to a very different set of values and priorities. This example again 
illustrates the contradictory and hybrid character of China’s transnationalizing 
51 Employing social network analysis techniques: see e.g. John Scott and Peter J. Carrington, eds, The Sage 
handbook of social network analysis (London: Sage, 2011).
52 These interviews were conducted primarily during field trips in November 2013 and March 2015. 
53 De Graaff and van Apeldoorn, ‘US elite power and the rise of Chinese “statist” elites’.
54 De Graaff, ‘Global networks and the two faces’.
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state-directed capital, in this case pertaining to the roles and perceptions of top 
SOE directors and executives.
The specific ‘statist’ characteristics of China’s transnationalizing capital and 
of the elites that direct this capital have implications for the liberal world order 
and its dominant elite power structures. China has in the past decade become a 
major outward investor, first primarily in developing economies, but increasingly 
also within Europe and the United States.55 While the stock of US foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in China is still four times that of Chinese FDI in the United 
States, Chinese FDI into the US in terms of annual flows currently surpasses that 
of US FDI into China.56 And state-owned capital still accounts for a dominant 
share of Chinese outward foreign direct investments (OFDI). To be sure, the share 
of non-state-owned Chinese investments is growing rapidly. The share of private 
OFDI (i.e. without any state ownership involved) in large investments (above US$1 
million) grew from zero to 22 per cent between 2005 and 2015, calculated on the 
basis of the value of the investments.57 This is a significant trend, which signals 
a partial adaptation of China’s investment strategy to the liberal international 
order in which private enterprise and capital are predominant. However, over 
three-quarters of those outward investments (in terms of their value) are still 
state-owned. Moreover, it should be noted that in the case of China the lack of 
state ownership does not imply lack of state control or state direction. Large outward 
investments still need state approval (rather than mere registration), and Chinese 
private enterprises above a certain size always have a party secretary and a party 
commission included in the organizational structure of the company. All these 
factors illustrate the state-directed nature of Chinese transnationalizing capital.
The contradictions within China’s state-directed capitalism will arguably only 
deepen with the country’s further integration into the world economy. Managing 
these contradictions will therefore be a key challenge for the Chinese  leadership 
and (foreign) policy-making elites—not only domestically, in overcoming formi-
dable obstacles to reform of the state-owned industries to counter corruption and 
inefficiency—but also in foreign policy strategy. Yet, importantly, the outcome 
in terms of conflict and/or adaptation on the part of China and the United 
States—the assessment of which is largely a matter of speculation (a question 
to which we will return at the end of this article)—depends not only on how 
China’s foreign policy and state-society complex develops, but crucially also on 
the United States, to which we now turn.
55 Thilo Hanneman, Daniel Rosen and Cassie Gao, Two-way street: 25 years of US–China direct investment (New 
York: Rhodium Group, Nov. 2016); Jan Drahokouphil, ed., Chinese investment in Europe: corporate strategies and 
labour relations (Brussels: European Trade Union Institute, 2017).
56 Hanneman et al., Two-way street.
57 Naná de Graaff, ‘China goes West! The transnationalizing networks of Chinese investments, firms and busi-
ness elites’, conference paper, 58th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Baltimore, 
February 2017. 
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Corporate elite networks and the social sources of America’s liberal 
 internationalist foreign policy
China’s phenomenal rise has inevitably had an impact on the position of global 
power from which the United States has since 1945 been leading the liberal world 
order, and thus necessitates a strategic response from what much of the literature 
still identifies as the global hegemon.58 From our perspective, in order to make 
sense of America’s strategic response to China we have to shift our focus towards 
America’s particular state–society model and analyse the elite networks of which 
its foreign policy-makers are part, and which help us to account for the world-
view, ideas and interests with which they are bound up.
Our earlier research into the social networks of the top foreign policy-makers 
of the past three administrations (before Trump) has shown that around two-thirds 
had top-level corporate affiliations before serving in the administration, and about 
half returned to the corporate world after leaving government, establishing an 
extensive revolving-door pattern (see table 1).59
 
Our research also showed that while the overall composition of the corpo-
rate background of this selection of post-Cold War US grand strategy makers 
embraces a wide diversity of sectors, the corporate ties are overwhelmingly 
dominated by US transnationally orientated capital. That is to say, a majority of 
58 Layne, The peace of illusions; Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan.
59 Van Apeldoorn and de Graaff, American grand strategy and corporate elite networks, ch. 3.
Table 1: Corporate affiliations among grand strategy makers of recent US 
administrations
Clinton Bush Obama
Total 25 (197) 27 (157) 23 (126)
Before 18 (48) 21 (87) 23 (111)
After 22 (149) 21 (70)    7 (16)
Revolving door 
(before and after)
15 15    7 
Notes: Grand strategy makers here are the selected top officials (30 from each administra-
tion) involved in the formulation of foreign policy (strategy) broadly defined, including 
foreign economic policy. These include the president and the vice-president; the secre-
taries and deputy secretaries of state, defense and the treasury; as well as the secretary of 
commerce and the US trade representative; the CIA director and the president’s chief of 
staff and other top White House officials and advisers. The numbers refer to how many 
grand strategy makers in each administration held senior corporate positions either before 
or after serving in that administration, or both (the ‘revolving door’). The numbers in 
parentheses indicate how many affiliations were held by these grand strategy makers. 
Source: Van Apeldoorn and De Graaff, American grand strategy, p. 73.
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ties are either with very large American TNCs or financial institutions (with more 
than one-third of ties involving prior top-level positions at Fortune 500 compa-
nies) or with international corporate law firms and consultancies that have such 
large multinationals or Wall Street banks as their clients. Moreover, the strongly 
globally orientated financial sector predominates.
As well as identifying these direct corporate elite ties, we also found that 
America’s post-Cold War foreign policy-making elite is strongly embedded in 
the world of think-tanks and policy-planning bodies, which are in turn to a large 
extent funded by big business and directed by members of the country’s corporate 
elite.60 We traced a large network of extensive ties, shared across the Clinton, 
Bush and Obama administrations, with key policy-planning bodies such as the 
Council on Foreign Relations, the Aspen Institute, the Trilateral Commission 
and the Bilderberg Conference. These have been crucial platforms for the coordi-
nation of transnational corporate elite interests and the creation of international 
consent to the continuation of a US-dominated liberal world order based upon 
open markets and free flows of capital.61
The fact that such a large majority of top US grand strategy makers had prior 
ties to America’s largest transnational corporations and banks and to think-tanks 
funded by that same corporate community, with its clearly globalist or liberal 
internationalist outlook, helps to explain the world-view of this foreign policy 
elite and why it has, by and large, as we shall specify below, pursued a foreign 
policy strategy aimed at preserving a world order based upon open markets, free 
trade and liberal institutions, which has above all favoured the interests of US 
transnational capital and the corporate elite associated with it.62
It is this world-view, then, that has shaped America’s strategic response to 
China’s rise over the past decades, underpinning a strategy aimed at maintaining 
access to (and control over) the markets and commercial (sea) lanes of the Asian 
region. Here the possibility of closure—that is, a loss of economic openness in 
Asia and the ability to maintain and control that openness on US terms—is what 
constitutes the greatest threat to US interests.63
The US strategic response to China’s rise: the global open door 
and   ‘liberal  engagement’
Since the end of the Cold War, China’s rise has come to be seen by America’s foreign 
policy elite as both an opportunity and a threat. The opportunity is not just one 
for investment by US transnational capital into the biggest ‘emerging market’,64 
60 Van Apeldoorn and de Graaff, American grand strategy and corporate elite networks, pp. 89–95.
61 Stephen Gill, American hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); 
Ian N. Richardson, Andrew P. Kakabadse and Nada K. Kakabadse, Bilderberg people: elite power and consensus in 
world affairs (London and New York: Routledge, 2011).
62 Jeff Colgan and Robert O. Keohane, ‘The liberal order is rigged. Fix it now or watch it wither’, Foreign Affairs 
96: 3, May–June 2017, pp. 2–9, 36–44; Layne, ‘The US foreign policy establishment’.
63 See also Layne, ‘The US foreign policy establishment’.
64 Sean Starrs, ‘American economic power hasn’t declined—it globalized!, Summoning the data and taking 
globalization seriously’, International Studies Quarterly 57: 4, 2013, pp. 817–30.
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but also a more strategic opportunity to integrate China and its enormous market 
fully into the liberal world order, yet ultimately keep it subordinate to the United 
States as global hegemon and guarantor of global liberal capitalism.
The perceived threat is that China, with its new-found power, might yet turn 
against the liberal order from which it has been profiting greatly—not so much as 
to abandon its profitable globalizing strategy and close itself off from the world 
economy again, but enough to transform the order and change the rules of the 
game, making it less liberal and, above all, less US-led. This question of how to 
keep the door to the Chinese market open, while preventing China from using 
that open door to become so powerful as to challenge US hegemony and the 
liberal internationalism that has flourished since the end of the Cold War, sits 
at the heart of the dilemma facing American policy-makers in their search for a 
strategic response to the rise of China.
This dilemma has produced a strategy that showed a remarkable continuity 
from Clinton via Bush to Obama. In fact, the roots of this strategy go back 
much further, being based on an American grand strategy of ‘the global open 
door’ premised on open and free markets (open first and foremost to US capital) 
and concomitant liberal institutions that originated at the end of the nineteenth 
century—a strategy that was itself developed in part with an eye to the then also 
vast Chinese market. After 1945 this strategy was turned into a successful global 
hegemonic project—while China, of course, was from 1949 closed off from the 
new US-led global capitalist system.65
Deng’s opening in 1978 created the opportunity to reopen the door to China 
and resume the quest to integrate it into the American liberal order—a quest 
that, with the end of the Cold War, generated in turn the US strategy of liberal 
‘engagement’.66 First formulated in the mid-1990s by the Clinton administra-
tion, this has been a strategy of ‘further integrating China into the market-based 
world economic system’,67 but with an ‘insurance policy’ or ‘hedge’ against the 
potential risk that China would ultimately refuse to be integrated into the liberal 
world order on US terms, choosing instead to challenge US hegemony in east 
Asia. Under Clinton, engagement meant encouraging China’s integration into the 
global economic system and fostering ‘multilateral regional institutions’, but also 
strengthening America’s alliances and maintaining a large ‘forward-based troop 
presence’,68 in order to ‘discourage the emergence of a regional hegemon [read: 
China]’69 and to ensure ‘that trade flows freely in and out of the region’.70
65 Van Apeldoorn and de Graaff, American grand strategy and corporate elite networks; see also Layne, Peace of illusions; 
William Appleman Williams, The tragedy of American diplomacy, 50th anniversary edn (New York: Norton, 2009; 
first publ. 1959); Thomas McCormick, China market: America’s quest for informal empire, 1893–1901, (Chicago: 
Dee, 1990; first publ. 1967).
66 White House, A National Security Strategy of engagement and enlargement (Washington DC, Feb. 1995); Joseph S. 
Nye, Jr, ‘The case for deep engagement’, Foreign Affairs 74: 4, July–Aug. 1995, pp. 90–102.
67 White House, A National Security Strategy for a new century (Washington DC, Dec. 1999), p. 38.
68 Nye, ‘The case for deep engagement’, pp. 90, 91.
69 Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the east Asia–Pacific region (Washington DC, Feb. 1995), 
p. 6, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA298441.
70 Nye, ‘The case for deep engagement’, p. 95.
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Bush largely continued this strategy, completing the process initiated under the 
Clinton administration by fully backing China’s entry into the WTO in June 2001, 
seeing the policy as one of promoting economic and, ultimately, political freedom, 
and also, not unimportantly, opening the doors to US capital.71 The goal then was 
still to incorporate China into the US-led liberal world order by deepening trade 
relations and encouraging it to become, in the words of then US Deputy Secre-
tary of State, Robert Zoellick, a ‘responsible stakeholder’72—a phrase that nicely 
captures both the strategy and the underlying world-view of America’s China 
policy throughout the post-Cold War period. Nonetheless, tensions in US–China 
relations remained and, especially under Bush and his neo-conservative advisers, 
emphasis was put on a rising China not just as an opportunity but also, in the 
words of Robert Kagan, as ‘the most serious long term challenge to the unipolar 
global order’.73
While Obama’s signature foreign policy of the ‘pivot’ to Asia was presented as 
something new, its main elements were in fact a continuation of the policy already 
set in place by the Clinton administration. The only really new aspect, with 
respect to Bush, was the relative shift of geographical focus from the Middle East 
to east Asia—a ‘strategic turn to the [Asian] region’ that, according to Obama’s 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, ‘fitted logically in our overall global patterns 
to secure and sustain America’s global leadership’.74 In line with a strategy that, 
as noted above, stretches back to the end of the nineteenth century, and has been 
driven by the expansionist logic of American capital, Clinton also emphasized the 
‘unprecedented opportunities for investment, [and] trade’ that would come with 
‘open markets in Asia’.75
At the same time, the Obama administration increasingly came to perceive 
China as a (potential) geopolitical contender, and to formulate the mission of 
the Asia pivot as ‘upholding the rules’ (of liberal order) against a country that 
might refuse to follow these rules.76 Thus managing China’s rise and maintaining 
the open door in Asia with ‘every element of American power’77—from trade 
to defence policy—became a focal point of Obama’s foreign policy. The main 
economic pillar of this approach was the Trans-Pacific Partnership—an arrange-
ment intended less to engage than to exclude China, seeking to make other 
countries in the region follow America’s ‘rules of the road’ and thus prevent the 
rise of a more Sinocentric economic area. Beefing up its naval presence in the 
Pacific and strengthening military ties with both old and new allies, the Obama 
administration also continued the line of backing up economic openness with 
71 George W. Bush, speech at Boeing Plant, Washington State, 17 May 2000: excerpts published in New York 
Times, 18 May 2000, http://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/051800bush-text.html.
72 Robert B. Zoellick, ‘Whither China: from membership to responsibility?’, remarks to National Committee 
on US–China Relations, 21 Sept. 2005, New York City.
73 Cited in Maria Ryan, Neoconservatism and the new American empire (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), p. 157.
74 Hillary Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific century’, Foreign Policy, no. 189, Nov. 2011, pp. 56–63.
75 Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific century’.
76 Tom Donilon, ‘America is back in the Pacific and will uphold the rules’, Financial Times, 28 Nov. 2011, p. 11.
77 Barack Obama, remarks to the Australian Parliament, Canberra, 17 Nov. 2011, publ. online by Gerhard Peters 
and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency project.
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military hard power. In this way it sought to ensure a ‘hedge’ against a potential 
Chinese revisionism78—increasingly so against the background of what came to 
be perceived as as a new, dangerous assertiveness on the part of China, especially 
in acting upon its territorial ambitions with regard to the South China Sea.79
Indeed, the strategy of ‘engagement with an insurance policy’ that has been 
in place with some variations for over two decades has been not the resolution 
but rather the manifestation of the fundamental dilemma facing American grand 
strategy makers. For their part, the Chinese have often had trouble distinguishing 
America’s hedging from containment, and have tended to perceive Obama’s Asia 
pivot as a form of expansionism, encroaching on their sphere of influence and 
seeking to expand and deepen US hegemony, which has indeed been the inten-
tion. Arguably, the United States has in this way provoked precisely the kind 
of behaviour on the part of the Chinese that it had hoped to prevent,80 and of 
which Joseph Nye recently warned.81 On the other hand, there are those in the US 
foreign policy establishment who worry that the engagement part of the American 
strategy has already backfired, allowing China to develop so successfully as to 
become a serious geopolitical competitor.82 The strategic dilemma confronting 
American grand strategy makers has arguably deepened, possibly leading to splits 
within the foreign policy establishment.
Enter Trump, who is seen as representing a radical break with American grand 
strategy as premised upon liberal internationalism and presumably thus also signal-
ling an end to the previous administrations’ attempts to maintain and if possible 
widen the open door in east Asia. After two decades of continuity in America’s 
China strategy, the stage appears to be set for fundamental change.83
In the light of this exposition we will, by way of conclusion, analyse the most 
recent dynamics of US–China relations and reflect upon the scenarios of conflict, 
co-optation and coexistence outlined in the introduction to this article, and upon 
the future of the liberal international order.
US–China relations and the future of the liberal order—in for a radical 
shift?
While it is hard to discern a clear foreign policy strategy, let alone a ‘grand’ strategy, 
of the new US administration vis-à-vis China so far, Trump’s withdrawal of the 
United States from the TPP—the economic crown jewel in Obama’s Asia pivot—
78 Suisheng Zhao, ‘Shaping the regional context of China’s rise: how the Obama administration brought back 
hedge in its engagement with China’, Journal of Contemporary China 21: 75, 2012, pp. 369–89.
79 John Åberg, ‘A struggle for leadership recognition: the AIIB, reactive Chinese assertiveness, and regional 
order’, Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations 2: 3, 2016, pp. 1125–71.
80 Åberg, ‘A struggle for leadership recognition’; Jennifer Lind, ‘Asia’s other revisionist power: why US grand 
strategy unnerves China’, Foreign Affairs 92: 2, March–April 2017, pp. 78, 79.
81 Joseph Nye, Jr, ‘Work with China, don’t contain it’, New York Times, 26 Jan. 2013, p. 19.
82 Robert Blackwill and Ashley Tellis, Revising US grand strategy toward China (New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2015), p. 4.
83 G. John Ikenberry, ‘The plot against American foreign policy’, Foreign Affairs 96: 3, May–June, 2017, pp. 2–9; 
Peter Dombrowski and Simon Reich, ‘Does Donald Trump have a grand strategy?’, International Affairs 93: 5, 
Sept. 2017, pp. 1013–38.
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and his subsequent withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change, seem 
to pave the way for China to take a leadership role in regional free trade as well 
as in the global efforts to combat climate change. Xi seems to be embracing this 
role, which fits well with his more assertive foreign policy as described above. 
Xi’s high-level presence at the 2017 meeting of the World Economic Forum in 
Davos—the gathering of the world’s leading business and political elites—and his 
advocacy there of free markets and globalization,84 while Trump stayed at home 
tweeting about ‘America First’, symbolically underscored what seemed to be a 
historic reversal of roles.
We have argued that in order to understand the development of US–China 
relations and the contradictions and dilemmas in the two countries’ respective 
foreign policy strategies, we need to move beyond a state-centric perspective and 
take into account their distinctive state–society models and the ways in which 
leading elites are rooted in these social power structures, which influence their 
interests, ideas and world-view, and hence the foreign policy they formulate.
Thus while Xi embraces globalization and is now himself advocating an open 
door to trade and investment—in line with the deepening integration of China’s 
economy within global capitalism—we have also shown in this article how 
‘capitalism with Chinese characteristics’ is still very much ‘state-directed’, and 
will remain so for the foreseeable future. This entails a hybrid and contradictory 
set of interests and values on the part of Chinese political and corporate elites—
with an underpinning world-view that is quite distinctive from the American, and 
can be expected to lead to contention on the latter’s part. While China is partially 
adapting to the liberal institutions and rules of the game, there are also limits to 
its liberalization: in particular, regulatory reforms at the domestic level, such as 
setting anti-discriminatory rules for government procurement, are likely to be 
resisted. We therefore think a scenario of full co-optation rather unlikely.
Nor do we see evidence of a scenario of major conflict in the making, although 
there remains fundamental divergence both in the realm of economic interests 
(trade, investment and development) and in the security realm (crystallized most 
markedly in tensions over the South China Sea and North Korea). While during 
the presidential election campaign Trump clearly painted China as the enemy 
with respect to American jobs, since taking office he has so far refrained from 
denouncing China as a currency manipulator or starting the trade war he had 
announced. Indeed, after Xi’s state visit to Washington in April 2017, Trump 
appeared to stay to the script of engagement and even partnership by extending 
lavish praise to his guest.
Do these developments, then, point towards a scenario of coexistence? Is a 
‘G2 with Chinese characteristics’ in the making? To a large extent we think there 
is; particularly if we take a slightly longer-term perspective, that is, beyond the 
current US administration. Arguably, the interdependencies in terms of trade and 
84 Xi Jinping, ‘Jointly shoulder responsibility of our times, promote global growth’, keynote speech at World 
Economic Forum Annual Meeting, Davos, 17 Jan. 2017, CGTN, https://america.cgtn.com/2017/01/17/full-
text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum.
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finance, with China too deeply invested in US Treasury bonds to risk an escalation 
on either side, serve to contain their conflicting interests, leaving the United States 
and China ‘locked in a delicate dance’.85 This scenario, however, also involves 
many instabilities and internal contradictions. It would first of all require that 
China stick to its script of refraining from any ambition to take over the leader-
ship from the United States, or to challenge its military superpower status. At the 
same time, it would also require adaptation from the American side—not least in 
terms of China’s preference for autocratic leadership, which might perhaps not be 
too problematic while Trump is in office. Beyond that, whether such a scenario 
of coexistence can be successfully maintained arguably hinges crucially on the 
way the US strategy evolves. In turn, this scenario is also conditional upon the 
outcome of the domestic political contestation and balance of social forces within 
the state–societies of both the United States and China.86
This is well understood by the current Chinese leadership, which has combined 
its long-term strategic vision—with Xi holding very firm control of the (geo-)
economic and (geo)political direction of China—with a centralization of elite 
power aimed at unity and cohesion, repressing internal dissent both within the 
party and beyond.87 China’s state–society model, however, also contains significant 
internal contradictions, as noted above, as evident in conflicts around economic 
reform within different sectors and between state-dominated and private capital, 
and in the predicaments around the rule of law.
Within the liberal world (primarily the United States and Europe), domestic 
social and political contestations have meanwhile produced formidable ‘challenges 
from within’, with the rise of broad anti-liberal and anti-elite populist movements 
such as led to the vote for Brexit and the election of Trump.88 With the new US 
administration a partly—though certainly not wholly—new foreign policy elite 
has come to power with a different set of ideas, with respect both to China and to 
the liberal world order in general. How radical a break with the liberal internation-
alist foreign policy establishment this implies is unknown at the time of writing. 
The picture of what goes on inside the Trump administration is currently still very 
messy, with what seem to be different factions—a more ‘globalist’ faction (repre-
sented by individuals such as the director of the National Economic Council, Gary 
Cohn, and Trump’s special adviser Jared Kushner) and an outspoken ‘America first’ 
faction (represented by figures such as former chief strategist Steve Bannon)—
moving in opposite directions, and a chaotic and highly unpredictable head of 
state aggravating existing tensions and contradictions.
Nevertheless, it seems by now that Trump’s foreign policy does not mean isola-
tionism or an American retreat from key strategic areas such as east Asia. Indeed 
there are, notwithstanding all the bluster and confrontational tweets, some signs 
of rather strong continuity. Although there have been mixed signals, the United 
85 Wang Yong and Louis Pauly, ‘Chinese IPE debates on (American) hegemony’, Review of International Political 
Economy 20: 6, 2013, pp. 1165–88.
86 See Skidmore, Contested social orders. 
87 Yu, ‘Motivations behind China’s “one belt, one road” initiatives’.
88 We thank one of the reviewers for reminding us to point out this important dimension.
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States appears to remain committed to its traditional allies such as Japan and South 
Korea.89 Indeed, far from threatening to ‘bring the troops back home’, according 
to the traditional isolationist trope against which liberal internationalists such as 
Hillary Clinton have always warned,90 the new administration has announced 
further reinforcement of its military presence in the region, not only vis-à-vis 
North Korea but more broadly. Furthermore, with respect to the South China Sea 
the new Republican administration by and large seems to be following the line set 
by Hillary Clinton, who as Obama’s Secretary of State declared that maintaining 
the freedom of the seas was a core US interest.
In sum, while the US-led liberal world order has certainly been put under 
severe strain by the Trump presidency, and while this tension is leaving its mark 
on America’s role in Asia and its relations with China, we do not yet observe a 
wholesale replacement of America’s post-Cold War globalist and ‘liberal engage-
ment’ as pursued by Obama. Although the engagement may turn out to be less 
deep in the future, as well as less liberal, there is no strategic retreat from the area 
and the policy signals are mixed.
Conclusion: a research agenda
This conclusion remains, of course, speculative, pending the unfolding of real-
world affairs and future research. With regard to the latter, we have in this 
article discussed our findings related to the three post-Cold War administrations 
preceding Trump, and have pointed out the close nexus between the foreign 
policy elite and the corporate elite that has been a crucial source for the liberal 
foreign policy that characterized these administrations. Although Trump was 
elected on a promise to ‘drain the swamp’, he did, of course—besides being a 
billionaire businessman himself—fill his cabinet with many of the Wall Street 
elite with whom he had promised to break, even if his top foreign policy-makers 
seem much less embedded than their precedessors in the foreign policy planning 
network of corporate-funded, ‘globalist’ think-tanks that have traditionally made 
up the US foreign policy establishment. This may herald a more fundamental 
change in US foreign policy, but awaits more systematic empirical research into 
the networks behind the Trump administration and an analysis of how this trans-
lates into foreign policy-making under Trump and into the US–China relation-
ship: an exciting new research agenda.
Similarly, the Chinese foreign policy elite networks and the distinctive way 
in which they are linked to the domestic political economy and China’s transna-
tionalizing capital—illustrated in this article through insights based on one state-
dominated sector—need to be much more extensively mapped and investigated. 
Different networks and configurations of actors and interests can be expected to 
be linked to different issue areas and institutions, one key dimension of course 
being that of state-owned and private enterprise. But various constellations 
89 Bilahari Kausikan, ‘Asia in the Trump era: from pivot to peril?’, Foreign Affairs 96: 3, May–June 2017, pp. 146–53.
90 Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific century’.
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can also be expected within single institutions, leading to variation in China’s 
behaviour. Within the WTO, for instance, while generally acting as a pragmatic 
rule-taker, China has engaged in rule-bending and even rule-breaking in sectors 
such as metals and agriculture.91 Future research along these lines, investigating 
the changing elite networks and elite strategies on both sides of the US–China 
relationship, will be key to an understanding of how this relationship will evolve 
within a scenario of coexistence in the future, and whether this will lead to a 
fundamentally different world order.
91 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this remark.
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